My characterization of uncertainty is quite different from the usual one in which some parameter or variable is taken to be unknown. Demand uncertainty is modeled by assuming that the market demand function shifts randomly but continuously through time according to a stochastic process. Thus, although today's demand is known exactly, future demand may be larger or smaller and has a variance that increases with the time horizon. Similarly, reserve uncertainty is modeled by assuming that available reserves shift upward or downward, again according to a stochastic process. Thus, as exploitation proceeds over time, resource producers may find that more or less reserves are available for production than originally expected.
In such a world, the observed market price will be a random process, but there are a number of questions to be asked about the behavior of the market in expected value terms. First, should the expected price behave differently in the presence of such uncertainty than in its absence? For example, should the presence of uncertainty cause producers-in competitive or monopolistic markets-to be more or less conservationist than they would be otherwise? Second, does the competitive market exploit the resource at a rate that is socially optimal in the presence of uncertainty? Finally, what are the implications of uncertainty for exploration, either as a means of reducing the uncertainty itself or simply to accumulate additional reserves?
I show in this paper that with constant extraction costs and riskneutral firms, neither demand nor reserve uncertainty (as characterized here) affects the expected price dynamics in competitive or monopolistic markets, and Hotelling's (1931) r-percent rule still applies. (The dynamics of output may, however, change in the presence of uncertainty.) We will see that when extraction costs are a function of the level of reserves, demand uncertainty still has no effect on the expected behavior of price, although reserve uncertainty will affect price.' In both cases, however, the rate of production in a competitive market is still socially optimal.2 Next the model is extended to include exploration. Exploration has I Of course, when extraction costs are not constant, the r-percent rule no longer applies even in the deterministic case. See Levhari and Liviatan (1977) and Pindyck (1978a) . 2 Weinstein and Zeckhauser (1975) examined demand uncertainty using a discretetime model similar to the one in this paper where current demand is known but demands in future periods are unknown (but are revealed at the beginning of each period). They also found that (with zero extraction costs and risk-neutral firms) the expected competitive market price will rise at the rate of interest, and the competitive market equilibrium is socially optimal. Here I extend the Weinstein-Zeckhauser results to the continuous-time case. two functions-to obtain information and to actually increase reserves. I separate these two functions by introducing exploratory effort as a second policy variable in two different ways. First I treat exploratory effort as an input to the production of a stock of "knowledge," with the variance of reserve fluctuations declining as that stock increases. Here we find that exploratory effort is nonzero (and there is a value to information) only if extraction costs depend on reserves. Second, I treat exploratory effort as an input to the production of reserve discoveries, with uncertainty over the future response of discoveries to exploratory effort. This uncertainty, introduced through a parameter in the discoveries function that evolves according to a stochastic process, has no effect on the expected dynamics of market price and will affect the expected dynamics of exploratory effort only if the discoveries function is nonlinear in the stochastic parameter.
This paper can be viewed as one of a series of papers of the "cake-eating" genre that have appeared over the past few years. (In this paper both the size of the cake and the consumer's appetite are changing randomly as the cake is being eaten.) In related papers, Kemp (1976) , Hoel (1978) , Loury (1978) , Gilbert (1979) , and Heal (1979) examine resource exploitation when the level of reserves is unknown. (Heal also considers the case of known reserves with an additional discovery of unknown size occurring at some discrete unknown time in the future, and Long [1975] examines the case of known reserves that may be expropriated at some time in the future.)
For most resources, however, the greatest uncertainty is over how reserves will change in the future-that is, what effective recoverable reserves will be over the lifetime of resource use. If a known reserve level changes randomly but continuously over time, then, as we will see, the optimal rate of resource use and the behavior of the market price will differ considerably from the case where the reserve level is simply unknown or where it is known but discrete changes in reserves (such as a new discovery in the paper by Heal [1979] or expropriation in the paper by Long [1975] ) occur at discrete times.
Similarly, Dasgupta and Heal (1974) and Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1978) examine the effects of demand uncertainty on the pattern of resource use. In their models, changes in demand of discrete size occur at discrete and unknown future times as the result of an invention of a substitute for the resource. But the sudden invention and commercialization of a competitive substitute is rare; and it is more common to witness gradual changes in technologies, factor prices, other economic variables, and environmental restrictions that cause gradual changes (sometimes upward) in the costs of substitutes and thus gradual changes in resource demand. Again, we will see that random but continuous changes in demand over time lead to a different pattern of resource use than do discrete changes in demand.
In the next section I describe our treatment of uncertainty in more detail and set forth the basic model. The solution to this model is obtained in Section III and discussed in Section IV. Section V examines the use of exploration as a means of reducing uncertainty, and Section VI examines the optimal use of exploration for reserve accumulation under uncertainty. The results are summarized in the concluding section.
II. The Basic Model
My model of the resource market includes rising extraction costs and is straightforward except that the market-demand function and the reserve level are driven by stochastic processes with independent increments (Ito processes). I first describe the dynamics of demand and the reserve level and then state the firm's production problem, which is solved using stochastic dynamic programming.3
The market demand function has the form p = p(q,t) = y(t)f(q),
withf'(q) < 0, and y(t) a stochastic process of the form e = adt + a1dz1 = adt + o-1E1(t)\/Ht (2) By where E1(t) is a serially uncorrelated normal random variable with zero mean and unit variance (i.e., dz1 describes a Wiener process).4 Equation (2) implies that uncertainty about demand grows with the time horizon,5 and that fluctuations in demand occur continuously over time. No jumps in y(t) are possible, and y(t) is continuous with probability 1 (although over any finite time period any change in dyly of finite size is possible). I stress this point because it distinguishes our characterization of demand uncertainty. In Dasgupta and Heal (1974) and Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1978) 
is a random variable with mean Ro and variance -2 T. Also, because effective reserves is unknown and because demand fluctuates randomly, the terminal time T (the end of the planning period defined as the time when average profit first becomes zero) is also a random variable. In physical terms, reserves in this model are closest in nature to the published estimates (for oil and natural gas) of "proved reserves," as long as we remember that estimated proved reserves are, in fact, revised regularly. In the model the current reserve estimate Ro represents the volume of resource that could be produced today if there were no capacity constraints on the rate of production. This estimate will change over time as a result of new geological surveys that extend known reservoirs, as a result of the information that comes about from exploratory activity, or as a result of the production process itself (e.g., a drop in reserves occurring as water seeps into a reservoir).
The production problem is therefore one of stochastic optimization. Producers must determine the rate of production q(t) over time so that at each point in time the expected value of the sum of discounted profits to go is maximized. Initially, at t = 0, the problem is thus 
where Cl(R) is average production cost, with C(R) < 0. In the competitive case, each producer solves the problem assuming thatf(q) = f is an exogenous parameter independent of that producer's production. 
that is, the shadow price of the resource should equal the incremental profit that could be obtained by selling an additional unit. Note that in the competitive case, equation (7) is linear in q. Producers will therefore produce at maximum capacity if Hdlq > JR and will produce nothing if Hdlq < JR, so that market clearing implies Hdlq = JR. Equation (8) could be substituted back into equation (7) 
Equations (10) What is more interesting is that if average production cost is constant (or linear in R), the expected rate of change of price is the same as in the certainty case. This may seem strange at first and contradictory to the results of other studies. It is easier to understand if we keep in mind the difference in the nature of the uncertainties in our model from those in the models of other studies.
In Kemp (1976) , Loury (1978) , Gilbert (1979) , and Heal (1979) , for example, reserve uncertainty is characterized by a level of reserves that is simply not known, so that the resource producer (or social planner) may suddenly find the stock depleted. Like the driver of a car without a gas gauge, he is likely to adopt a more "cautionary" rate of resource use. In this model, on the other hand, the current reserve level is known exactly at each moment of time, and with a finite production rate it is impossible for that level to drop to zero instantaneously. Since the stochastic component of reserves is continuous in time and the reserve level can be monitored, the rate of resource use can be continuously adapted to the changing reserve level, and thus the expected rate of change of the value of the resource is unaffected by uncertainty.
To use a distinction introduced by Merton (1975) , in this model there is no "current" uncertainty but only "future" uncertainty. Using this analogy, holding an exhaustible resource asset in the modelwhether by a competitor, a monopolist, or a social planner-is like continually reinvesting in very short-term bonds as interest rates fluctuate stochastically, so that the return from the asset over the next "instant" is known with certainty. In the other studies cited, the return over any period, however small, is uncertain, as the resource holder can suddenly find his reserves exhausted.
It is interesting to note that even with average cost constant, the expected rate of change of production can differ from that in the certain case-even though the expected rate of change of price is the same as the certainty case. The expected rate of change of production is found by recognizing that the optimal rate of production is a function of the state variablesy and R-that is, q = q*(y,R)-and then expanding the differentials dq and dp using Ito's lemma. 
where qy and qR are the derivatives of the optimal rate of production with respect to y and R. It is shown in Appendix A that qy > 0, so that y < 0 iff"(q) 0 0 but is of undetermined sign iff"(q) > 0. The effects of demand and reserve fluctuations are easiest to see by considering the two components of y-the term inf' and the term inf"-separately.
The term inf'(q) tends to increase the rate at which q falls and therefore raises the initial qo (and lowers po). This occurs because given any value of a, a larger value of o-1 causes the demand curve to rotate downward over time (in expected value terms) at a faster rate (see n. 4 above). Given the r-percent rule for the rate of growth of price, this accelerates the rate at which q falls and requires a larger initial qo for the terminal condition (that expected reserves and expected demand become zero simultaneously) to hold.8
The term inf"(q) tends to reduce the rate at which q falls and lower qo iff" > 0. The reason is that fluctuations in p of mean zero imply a net increase (decrease) in q if f" > (<) 0. Thus equation (15) The effects of uncertainty on production are similar in the case of a monopolist, except that the rate of change of q will depend onf."' as well asf". Results for this case are given in Appendix A.
It is also shown in Appendix A that the expected rate of production under social welfare maximization is the same as with a competitive market as long as producers are (as has so far been assumed) risk neutral. Risk-averse producers will underconserve, with p beginning lower and rising more rapidly than in equation (15).9
V. The Use of Exploration to Reduce Uncertainty
We have seen that demand and reserve uncertainty will alter the rate of resource production and, if production cost is a nonlinear function of reserves, will alter the expected rate of change of price as well. A question that naturally arises is, What expense would producers be willing to incur to reduce this uncertainty?
In this section I introduce exploration as a means of reducing stochastic fluctuations in reserves by extending the basic model in a simple way.10 Producers now adjust two policy variables over time, production q and the level of exploratory activity w, to maximize: In an earlier paper (Pindyck 1978b ) I examined the linkage between resource exploration and production through a deterministic model in which reserves can be maintained or increased through exploration, and production costs vary inversely with the reserve level.14 Here I extend that model by introducing into the discoveries function a parameter that follows a stochastic process. The effects of uncertainty can then be examined by comparing the results here with those of the earlier paper.
As before, producers in this model determine production q and the level of exploratory effort w. The rate of reserve discoveries depends on w, on cumulative discoveries x, and on a parameter 0 that follows a stochastic process-that is, x =f(w,x,0), withfw > 0 andf, < 0. Thus, as exploration and discovery proceed over time, it becomes more and more difficult to make new discoveries. I make no assumption now about the way 0 affects the discovery rate except that be smooth in 0, but I specify the dynamics of 0 as dO = o-(0)dz = o(0)E(t)ViiL (24) so that E (dO) = 0. Thus (given w and x), the rate of discoveries today is known exactly, but we cannot know what the rate will be in the future.15 13 The reader can show, by expandingdq = d[q*(R,K)] to obtain (1/dt)Etdq, that in this context exploratory activity has no effect on the dynamics of production. The expected rate of change of q is again given by eqq. (18) and (19) (but with oa = 0).
14 That paper shows that if the reserve level is initially very small, the equilibrium price trajectory will be U shaped in both competitive and monopolistic markets. under both competition and monopoly.'7 Equations (29), (30), and (31) can be compared with equations (9), (15), and (13) in Pindyck (1978b) . It can be seen from this that uncertainty as modeled here has no effect on the expected rate of change of market price but will have an effect on the expected rate of change of exploratory effort and therefore on the expected level of market price.
whole. Taking oil exploration in the United States as an example, the aggregate discoveries likely to result from a given total level of exploratory activity this year can be assessed with limited uncertainty. The uncertainty becomes much greater, however, as we try to assess the discoveries likely to result in future years. 16 Note that there is no demand uncertainty in the model. Demand uncertainty, as specified in Section II, is easily shown to have no effect on the dynamics of price and exploration as long as it is uncorrelated with fluctuations in 6. I therefore ignore it for simplicity. 17 This does not mean that the expected pattern of exploratory activity is the same in the competitive and monopoly cases; q will be initially lower for the monopolist, so that (l/dt)Etdw will be larger, since CQ(R) is negative. Thus, the monopolist will initially undertake less, but later more, exploratory activity than the competitive industry.
The effect of uncertainty depends on the nonlinearity off with respect to 0 and works in much the same way that reserve uncertainty affected price in our model without exploration. Iffw,0 > 0 andfww < 0, uncertainty will make (1/dt)Etdw larger (and the initial value of w smaller). For example, in the certainty case, if R is initially very small, w will begin high, with zb < 0 (see Pindyck 1978b). It can be seen from equation (31) that iffy09 > 0, (1/dt)Etdw will be larger, so that w will begin at a lower level and fall less rapidly. However, this does not imply a reduction in the rate of reserve accumulation. Withft,9 > 0 any increase in 0 will raise the marginal physical product of exploratory effort more than an equal decrease in 0 will lower it. Zero-mean fluctuations in 0 will, on average, increase the productivity of exploratory effort, thereby reducing the amount of exploration currently needed in the intertemporal trade-off between the gain from postponing exploration (and discounting its cost) and the loss from higher current production costs resulting from a smaller reserve base. Similarly, in the certainty case if R is initially large, w will be initially small, with d > 0 at first and < 0 later. Withftw0 > 0, fluctuations in 0 will make w still smaller at first and (I /dt)Etdw larger (although w and q will fall to zero later because of the increase in productivity).
A simple example of a discovery function isf(w, x) = Awae-x.l8 Linear shifts of this function, for examplef(w,x,0) = A0wae-x, with dO = o-Odz, will clearly have no effect on the expected level of exploratory effort. Although the future discovery rate is unknown, the current rate is known, and producers can continuously adjust to random changes in that rate. It is only where stochastic fluctuations in 0 on average raise (lower) the marginal product of exploration that the initial w is decreased (increased). For example, the initial w is reduced if f(w, x, 0) = Awaoe-x, or Awae-1x, with dO = o-Odz in both cases.
These results also provide some insight into the measurement of resource scarcity. Resource "rent," that is, price net of extraction cost (or marginal revenue net of extraction cost in monopolistic markets), can be shown to be a useful measure of in situ scarcity, but it is not clear how rent itself should be estimated. 
that is, the sum of marginal discovery cost and the undiscounted shadow price of cumulative discoveries. As long as depletion lowers the productivity of exploration this last term will be positive, so that rent must be measured by subtracting extraction costs from the observed price or from some estimate of what the price would be in a free market.
VII. Concluding Remarks
The major results of this paper are summarized for the competitive market in table 1. These results are easier to understand if we remember that the characterization of uncertainty used here is different from that in most other studies of resource use. Here uncertaintywhether over demand for the resource, the reserve level, or a parameter affecting the response of discoveries to exploratory effortpertains to the future value of the variable in question. Producers in this model have complete information about the current status of the resource market; what they do not know is what the values of demand, reserves, and so forth will be in the future. However, since stochastic fluctuations occur continuously over time, producers (or social planners) can adapt to these fluctuations continuously. As a result, stochastic fluctuations alter the expected rate of change of price or exploratory activity only to the extent that the average cost of production or productivity of exploration is changed through nonlinearity in a fluctuating variable. Thus with average production cost constant, price will rise according to Hotelling's r-percent rule. However, even with C1 constant, the rate at which production falls, and the initial values of production and price, are affected by uncertainty. This occurs, first, because demand fluctuations cause rotational shifts in the demand function, and, second, because if demand is nonlinear, zero-mean fluctuations in price imply a net change in production for market clearing.
This paper also examined the use of exploration, first, as a means of gathering information and, second, to accumulate reserves. We have seen that exploration should be used for information gathering (i.e., to reduce the variance of stochastic reserve fluctuations) only if prothey show that rent can deviate from marginal discovery cost even if the shadow price of cumulative discoveries is zero. duction costs vary with reserves. If Cl(R) < 0, ex ante knowledge of the terminal time T and the distribution of R over time permit production costs to be reduced on average by allocating more production to periods when R is (known to be) larger. When exploration is used to accumulate reserves, the time profile of exploratory activity is altered if a stochastically fluctuating parameter enters the discoveries function nonlinearly. However, this occurs not because the future response of discoveries to exploration is not known but, rather, because fluctuations can change the average productivity of exploratory effort and thus shift the optimal level of exploration.
It must be asked whether real-world uncertainty in resource markets can be well approximated by the continuous stochastic processes used in this paper. I have argued that the major uncertainties over demand and reserves have more to do with the future values of those variables, with random changes usually occurring more or less continuously over time. Of course, resource markets are also affected by other types of uncertainty (e.g., several of the oil-exporting countries might suddenly cut production), and the results in this paper should therefore not be taken too literally. I have only examined the effects of a particular type of uncertainty on resource markets. 
where o(t) represents terms that vanish as dt -* 0. Also note that Et(dqdy) = -2ly2qydt + o(t).
Now, to determine the dynamics of production in the competitive case (with constant average production cost), expand dp = dAy(t)f(q)]: dp = yf'(q)dq + f (q)dy + Iyf"(q)(dq)2 +f' (q)dqdy. 
The behavior of q can be somewhat more complicated than in the competitive case insofar asf"'(q) might change sign as q falls. Thus q might at first fall more rapidly but later more slowly than in the certainty case. The dynamics of production under social welfare maximization are found by expanding d[u'(q)] and then following the same steps as in the competitive and monopoly cases above. The reader can easily demonstrate that equations (18) and (19) will again apply, so that the competitive market exploits the resource at the socially optimal rate. This is not the case, however, if the competitive producers are risk averse. If the integrand in equation (5) 
so thatJK, the shadow price of a unit of knowledge, is equal to e-rtC2(w)Ig'(w), the discounted marginal cost of "finding" that unit. To see that equation (15) again describes the dynamics of price, note that equation (10) results from differentiating (B2) with respect toR and rewriting using Ito's lemma, and equation (11) 
